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I. INTRODUCTION 
Can people expect buildings and infrastructure to last, 
keeping their occupants sheltered from the elements, free to go 
about their business? The professionals who design facilities—
as well as the taxpayers and entrepreneurs who fund them—
make this assumption, but is this a safe assumption to make? 
Contemplate the effect of one extreme event—a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake along the Cascadia Subduction Zone of the Pacific 
coast—and it is easy to realize that this is not a safe 
assumption.1 Though seismic technology can be used to fortify 
structures against extreme events and land use plans can keep 
development out of harm’s way, the adoption of these 
measures has not kept pace with scientific understanding of 
the risks, and the ensuing scenarios of mega-quakes portend 
widespread devastation across the urban landscape.2 For the 
                                               
* Associate Professor of Urban Design and Planning, College of Built 
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 1. Ryan Haas, What is a 9.0 Earthquake?, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Sept. 25, 2015 
7:37 AM), http://www.opb.org/news/series/unprepared/what-is-a-90-earthquake-/. 
2. The Western Washington University Resilience Institute put together a scenario 
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benefit of all involved, it may be helpful to recognize the 
barriers that prevent people from making investments that 
will withstand the test of time, because many such obstacles 
can be overcome with sound capital investment planning. This 
essay situates the problem of human vulnerability to extreme 
earthquakes within the emerging empirical science of 
behavioral economics. When science makes biases in capital 
investment predictable, solutions become self-evident. 
Many of the obstacles that stand in the way of seismically 
safe choices for buildings and infrastructure originate from the 
ways in which people view the past, present, and future. 
Economists have recognized for quite some time that although 
humans are rational thinkers, our thinking becomes distorted 
when asked to make a choice today in light of the past, or 
when making a choice today that will have lasting 
consequences.3 People may have a desire to make economically 
                                               
forecasting devastation from a mega-quake, which states: 
Should the earthquake and tsunami happen tomorrow, it could affect millions of 
people’s lives, property, infrastructure, and environment. The number of deaths 
could exceed 10,000, and more than 30,000 people could be injured. . . . For 
Washington and Oregon, the direct economic losses have been estimated at 
upward of $81 billion. These social and economic impacts could distress the region 
for years to come. 
W. WASH. U. RESILIENCE INST., CASCADIA RISING EXERCISE SCENARIO DOCUMENT 20 
(2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3149654/Cascadia-Rising-2016-
Exercise-Scenario.pdf. “Megaquake” is a shortened term for a “megathrust 
earthquake.”; 
Earthquakes … [of magnitude greater than or equal to] 8.7, … present hazards to 
lives and property that are far more extensive than a typical ‘great’ earthquake. 
We therefore adopt the term ‘megathrust earthquake’ after the common usage 
among paleoseismologists for exceptionally destructive earthquakes. 
Jeffrey Park et al., Performance Review of the Global Seismographic Network for the 
Sumatra-Andaman Megathrust Earthquake, 76 SEISMOLOGICAL RESEARCH LETTERS 
331, 329 (2005); See also Subduction Zone: Tsunamis Generated by Megathrust 
Earthquakes, INC. RES. INST. FOR SEISMOLOGY, 
https://www.iris.edu/hq/inclass/animation/subduction_zone_tsunamis_generated_by_m
egathrust_earthquakes   (last visited May 11, 2017) (“Megathrust earthquakes are: the 
most powerful earthquakes in the world [and] occur where two plates converge 
particularly in subduction zones”); 
“Very large earthquakes occur on fault areas where the slope is the most regular, 
or flat.” The Cascadia fault … lies along such a flat region, [noted] Rempel and 
Thomas… [and] Thomas said… “When Cascadia goes, it could be 1,000 kilometers 
(621 miles) if it ruptures completely.” 
Press Release, EUREKALERT!, Fault Curvature May Control Where Big Quakes Occur 
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2016-11/uoo-fcm112216.php. 
3. A. C. Pigou, discussing the tendency in economic exchange to discount rewards 
over time: 
Generally speaking, everybody prefers present pleasures or satisfactions of a given 
magnitude to future pleasures or satisfactions of equal magnitude, even when the 
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rational decisions, but are limited in their ability to do so by 
the context in which their decisions are made, their learning, 
and their beliefs about the choices before them.4 
The following paragraphs explain how bounded rationality, 
interpreted as three sources of bias in capital investments over 
time, give rise to seismically vulnerable built environments. 
First, decisions made today are tempered by past investments 
in the built environment, though past investments were often 
made without regard to current known hazards in the 
landscape. Second, despite widespread general knowledge of 
the threat of earthquakes, the human propensity to 
disproportionately value short-term benefits over long-term 
gains creates an incentive for people to avoid the expenditures 
necessary to safeguard capital assets. Third, the presentation 
of hazards in the landscape as risks in the future exacerbates 
these problems by levying the human habit of absorbing risk 
with inadequate attention to the consequences. To make more 
lasting investments in the built environment we must guard 
against these sources of bias. This essay concludes by outlining 
simple capital planning remedies. 
                                               
latter are perfectly certain to occur. But this preference for present pleasures does 
not—the idea is self-contradictory—imply that a present pleasure of given 
magnitude is any greater than a future pleasure of the same magnitude. It implies 
only that our telescopic faculty is defective. 
 A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24–25 (4th ed. 1932) (emphasis in original). 
4. Herbert Simon discusses the empirical evidence of bounds on rationality yet to be 
incorporated in economic theories of decision-making: 
We already have in psychology a substantial body of empirically tested theory 
about the processes people actually use to make boundedly rational, or reasonable 
decisions. This body of theory asserts that the processes are sensitive to the 
complexity of decision-making contexts and to learning processes as well. The 
application of this procedural theory of rationality to economics requires extensive 
empirical research, much of it at micro-micro levels, to determine specifically how 
process is molded to context in actual economic environments and the 
consequences of this interaction for the economic outcomes of these processes. 
Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209, S223 
(1986); See also David Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (“Our research attempted 
to obtain a map of bounded rationality, by exploring the systematic biases that 
separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal 
beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models”). 
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II. EARTHQUAKES TRANSFORM INVESTMENTS INTO 
LIABILITIES 
Human settlements rarely stray from the historical path of 
prior investments because people use the economic and social 
success of past investments to guide the choices they make 
today.5 Locational patterns of investment evolve from small 
historical events: from chance historical events, opportunities 
arise and grow into centers of commerce that attract and 
retain an expert labor force.6 Seemingly small acts—such as 
the 1968 purchase of a computer at Seattle’s Lakeside Middle 
School for a club that included 8th grader Bill Gates, Jr. and 
his subsequent access to computer labs at the University of 
Washington—can be thought of retrospectively as chance 
events on the path toward the formation of Microsoft, a pivotal 
entity in the evolution of technology and commerce in the 
greater Seattle region.7 Such events form paths within the 
greater historical context of the educational institutions, 
infrastructure investments, resource-based industries, and 
ports of trade that have served the Puget Sound.8 Reinforced 
by existing development patterns, decisions about where to 
build mark attempts to gain increasing returns from existing 
infrastructure, services, and associated economic conditions, 
such as opportunities for education, employment, and return 
on investment.9 
                                               
5. See Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92–
99; For a more general treatment of the economics of geography, see generally 
MASAHISA FUJITA ET AL., THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999). 
6. See Arthur, supra note 5, at 92–99. 
7. Quoting Bill Gates Jr. on the time when he first began to program computers, 
“It was my obsession” Gates says of his early high school years. “I skipped 
athletics. I went up there at night. We were programming on weekends. It would 
be a rare week that we wouldn’t get twenty or thirty hours in. There was a period 
where Paul Allen and I got in trouble for stealing a bunch of passwords and 
crashing the system. We got kicked out. I didn’t get to use the computer the whole 
summer. This is when I was fifteen and sixteen. Then I found out Paul had found 
a computer that was free at the University of Washington. They had these 
machines in the medical center and the physics department. They were on a 
twenty-four-hour schedule, but with this big slack period, so that between three 
and six in the morning they never scheduled anything.” Gates laughed. “I’d leave 
at night, after my bedtime. I could walk up to the University of Washington from 
my house, or I’d take the bus. That’s why I’m always so generous to the University 
of Washington, because they let me steal so much computer time.” 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 52–53 (2008). 
8. See generally PLANNING THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (Jill Sterrett et al. eds., 2015). 
9. See Arthur, supra note 5, at 92–99. 
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The historical path-dependence of human settlements may 
appear to be more of a liability than a benefit, however, when 
juxtaposed against the advancing science of earthquakes. The 
science of extreme events is relatively new to the scene of 
human settlement. The population of the Puget Sound had 
already reached about 500,000 by 1915, when Alfred Wegener 
published evidence for the theory of continental drift in The 
Origin of Continents and Oceans.10 Wegener’s publication 
sparked a debate that was not settled until the 1960s after the 
discovery of oceanic ridges and trenches and the role of 
subduction in making the Pacific Rim into a “ring of fire”—
where earthquakes 9.0 or greater in magnitude are known to 
occur.11 Scientists were aware that the Juan de Fuca plate was 
sliding beneath the coastline of the Pacific Northwest, creating 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone, yet were still unaware of any 
earthquakes caused by this motion.12 It was not until the 
1990s—after the Puget Sound surpassed 2.5 million 
residents—that historical evidence of a 9.0 earthquake on 
January 26, 1700 was pieced together, and scientists began in 
earnest to understand the vulnerability of this region to 
earthquakes.13 Since then, a 2012 analysis has confirmed that 
the region experienced nineteen earthquakes along the length 
of the subduction zone over the past 10,000 years, ranging in 
magnitude from 8.7 to 9.2.14 A more recent study suggests, on 
                                               
10. For historic population estimates, see Tom Trimbath, Seattle, King County and 
Puget Sound Keep on Growing, CURBED SEATTLE (JULY 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://seattle.curbed.com/2016/7/14/12179970/seattle-king-county-puget-sound-growth-
population; Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea, U. OF CAL. MUSEUM OF 
PALEONTOLOGY, http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/geology/techist.html (last visited May 
13, 2017) (citing ALFRED WEGENER, THE ORIGIN OF CONTINENTS AND OCEANS (John 
Biram trans., 1915)). 
11. See Plate Tectonics: The Rocky History of an Idea, supra note 10. 
12. Kathryn Schulz, The Really Big One, THE NEW YORKER (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/the-really-big-one; Robert Yates 
discusses the emergence of the science in Chapter 4 of his book, Living with 
Earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest. ROBERT YEATS, LIVING WITH EARTHQUAKES IN 
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 61–90 (Oregon State University Press eds., 2004) 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/oer/earthquake/index.html (ebook). 
13. Schulz, supra note 12; Yeats, supra note 12, at 61–90; Trimbath, supra note 10. 
14. In a press release from Oregon State University, lead researcher Chris 
Goldfinger described the findings: 
“Over the past 10,000 years, there have been 19 earthquakes that extended along 
most of the margin, stretching from southern Vancouver Island to the Oregon-
California border,” Goldfinger noted. “These would typically be of a magnitude 
from about 8.7 to 9.2 – really huge earthquakes. We’ve also determined that there 
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average, a recurrence interval of 430 years for quakes of this 
size, though the time between events has been as low as 100 to 
300 years.15 This is not welcome news to the Puget Sound. The 
region is approaching four million residents with no sign of 
slowing; much of this growth is in the vulnerable area west of 
the peaks of the Cascade Range, in the vicinity of Interstate-
5.16 When considering the possible effect of a 9.0 earthquake 
across Western Washington today, an estimated 5.4 million 
people are at risk.17 
This 200-year mismatch of timing between human 
settlement of Puget Sound and the science of earthquakes has 
profound implications. These scientific discoveries threaten to 
transform the physical assets of the entire region into 
liabilities. People have made capital investments seeking 
increasing returns, but investments made without knowledge 
of vulnerability and fortification against damage through 
siting, design, and construction, may be nothing more than 
sunk costs. People may not realize the extent to which their 
                                               
have been 22 additional earthquakes that involved just the southern end of the 
fault,” he added. “We are assuming that these are slightly smaller – more like 8.0 
– but not necessarily. They were still very large earthquakes that if they 
happened today could have a devastating impact.” 
Mark Floyd, 13-Year Cascadia Study Complete – And Earthquake Risk Looms Large, 
OR. ST. U. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2012/jul/13-year-
cascadia-study-complete-%E2%80%93-and-earthquake-risk-looms-large. 
15. Kale Williams, Risk of Major Quake on Cascadia Subduction Zone Higher than 
Previously Thought, THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 19, 2016, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2016/08/risk_of_major_quake_on_cascadi.html (“The northernmost 
section [of the Cascadia Subduction Zone], from Astoria [Oregon] to Vancouver Island 
in British Columbia, had its quake frequency revised down from an earthquake every 
500 to 530 years down to one every 430 years”); History of Earthquakes in Cascadia, 
CASCADIA REGIONAL EARTHQUAKE WORKGROUP http://www.crew.org/earthquake-
information/history-of-earthquakes-in-cascadia, (“Scientists believe the most recent 
subduction zone earthquake, a M9 event, occurred in January 1700. . . .  the years 
between these events have been as few as 100 to 300 years”) (last visited June 11, 
2017); see also Haas, supra note 1 (graph of “Cascadia Earthquake Time Line”). 
16. See Trimbath, supra note 10 (discussing population growth in the Puget Sound); 
Gary Lettman et al., Protecting Working Farm and Forest Landscapes: How Do Oregon 
and Washington Compare?, in PLANNING THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 51 (Jill Sterrett et 
al. eds., 2015) (noting land use change and population growth west of the Cascade 
Range from 1974 to 2009 during which “[a]pproximately 90 percent of the development 
of private land in western Oregon and Washington occurred within 30 miles of 
Interstate 5”). 
17. Sandi Doughton et al., Seismic Neglect: The Earthquake Nightmare Public 
Officials are Failing to Confront, THE SEATTLE TIMES (May 14, 2016), 
http://projects.seattletimes.com/2016/seismic-neglect/. 
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investments have devolved into sunk costs until disaster 
strikes, when they are forced to weigh the full value of losses 
against the benefits they had hoped to obtain. The population 
of the Puget Sound and greater Cascadia region is at risk 
because the built environment is mainly comprised of 
structures that were not designed to withstand an earthquake 
with a magnitude of 9.0. 
III. GENERAL THREATS OF EARTHQUAKE OFFER 
INADEQUATE COUNSEL 
Despite current knowledge of earthquakes, people struggle 
to visualize the future effects of such hazards on existing 
facilities.18 The vulnerability of capital assets to earthquakes is 
not common knowledge; it is specialized knowledge in 
engineering. Vulnerability can persist despite evidence of 
earthquake risk because bias in favor of present-day rewards 
gives momentum to developers in real estate who speculate in 
land, develop properties, and sell to the highest bidder, and 
who may continue to profit as they impart risk to the persons 
who purchase and occupy the property. Developers retain the 
expertise necessary to comply with protective seismic codes for 
buildings and construction, if policymakers are willing to 
impose this requirement. Regardless, the people who 
ultimately purchase property may be aware that the region 
suffers from earthquakes, but are not likely to have specialized 
knowledge of the vulnerability of individual properties to 
earthquakes. 
In the absence of specialized knowledge, people make capital 
investments according to preferences in settlement patterns 
that appear rational, such as the choice of a home in proximity 
to employers and family, but also subject to biases in decision-
making that appear less rational. In general, people are more 
emotional about the investments they make than one might 
                                               
18. Nate Berg, When, Not if: How Do San Franciscans Live with the Threat of the 
Next Quake?, THE GUARDIAN (March 27, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/mar/27/san-francisco-live-constant-risk-next-
major-quake#img-4 (“Earthquakes are just one example of how we all have a problem 
with risks that are very infrequent, low probability, despite their high consequence . . . 
. Cities around the world are exposed to a variety of low-likelihood but high-
consequence events, and because of our psychological nature, we’re not very good at 
assessing the risks”). 
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imagine from economic descriptions of rational actors.19 For 
example, the fear of loss is more powerful than gain, and this 
tendency can support decisions that maintain the status quo, 
even if this leads people to “throw good money after bad.”20 
People also use information that is easy to access when making 
decisions and may passively accept risks if those risks, such as 
earthquakes, are not highly regarded in the environment or 
“framework” of the decision to be made.21 People rely on 
intuition to set a frame for decisions: they may assume that a 
building is safe because a public authority granted a permit, 
even though the permit was granted prior to the local 
discovery of vulnerability to earthquake. Such limitations are 
not alleviated when investing in a capital asset such as a 
house, even though a house is likely to be the most expensive 
investment a person will make.22 Social desires for conformity 
and bandwagon effects, in addition to cost or price, can 
override the concern people may otherwise have for choosing 
safe locations, selecting safe designs for development, 
investing in seismic retrofits and insurance, and becoming 
prepared for earthquakes.23 Experience, good information, and 
prompt feedback are important factors that assist people in 
                                               
19. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 4. 
20. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988); Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting 
Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999). 
21. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 4, at 1459–60. Kahneman concludes that: 
[P]eople’s views of decisions and outcomes are normally characterized by ‘narrow 
framing’ . . . . [D]ecisions made in narrow frames depart far more from risk 
neutrality than decisions that are made in a more inclusive context. The 
prevalence of narrow frames is an effect of accessibility [of salient 
information] . . . . Narrow frames generally reflect the structure of the 
environment in which decisions are made. The choices that people face arise one 
at a time, and the principle of passive acceptance suggests that they will be 
considered as they arise. The problem at hand and the immediate consequences of 
the choice will be far more accessible than all other considerations, and as a result 
decision problems will be framed far more narrowly than the rational model 
assumes. 
Id. 
22. Id. at 1468–69 (“A growing literature of field research and field experiments 
documents large and systematic mistakes in some of the most consequential financial 
decisions that people make, including . . . actions in the real estate market.”) (citing 
David Genesove & Christopher J. Mayer, Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence 
from the Housing Market, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1233 (2001)). 
23. See KATHLEEN TIERNEY, THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF RISK: PRODUCING DISASTERS, 
PROMOTING RESILIENCE 48 (Karlene H. Roberts & Ian I. Mitroff eds., 2014) (discussing 
the sociological origins of development at risk of disaster and institutional inertia, 
including bandwagon effects and conformity amongst consumers). 
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making good decisions, but none of these characteristics are 
currently available to people as they place themselves and 
their assets at risk of mega-earthquakes in the Cascade 
Subduction Zone.24 
IV. RISKS TODAY BECOME INVESTMENTS TO BE MADE 
TOMORROW 
For local government planners, architects, engineers, and 
financial officers contemplating the next capital investment or 
permit, standard methods of assessing the value and risk of 
loss are not helpful in raising awareness of actual 
vulnerability. A two-fold problem is created by methods used to 
value assets in the future through discounting and to 
communicate the risk of extreme events. Discount rates, as 
applied in cost-benefit analyses, were invented to express the 
bias humans have for present expenditures over future 
savings.25 Applied to capital investments, however, discounting 
can result in severe problems, as durable assets appear to be 
disproportionately less appealing than short-lived assets with 
early returns on investment.26 Discount rates that reward 
                                               
24. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 72 (2008) (“In many areas, ordinary 
consumers are novices, interacting in a world inhabited by experienced professionals 
trying to sell them things. More generally, how well people choose is an empirical 
question, one whose answer is likely to vary across domains. It seems reasonable to 
say that people make good choices in contexts in which they have experience, good 
information, and prompt feedback . . . . They do less well in contexts in which they are 
inexperienced and poorly informed, and in which feedback is slow or infrequent”). 
25. See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A 
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002) (reviewing the origins, 
assumptions, and inadequacies, of the discounted utility model of intertemporal 
decision-making). 
26. Carl Koopmans & Piet Rietvold, Long-term Impacts of Mega-projects: The 
Discount Rate, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON MEGA-PROJECTS 314–15 (Hugo 
Priemus & Bert van Wee eds., 2013). Koopmans and Rietvold explain that although it 
is common to use discount rates derived from capital markets, “measured by means of 
the interest rate on government bonds”  in capital investments, when doing so, “rates 
derived from financial decisions on a time scale of at most a few decades may be 
applied to benefits and costs that occur over (much) longer periods, affecting future 
generations” and that, critically, this approach assumes “that welfare can be freely 
(re)distributed among generations within a country” such that if the current 
generation invests in a facility to benefit future generations in one respect, it “might 
reduce its endowments to future generations in other respects.” Id. The exhaustion of 
resources by current generations without compensation violates this assumption, and 
the widespread unsustainable use of natural resources without compensation explains 
how inequities arise from referencing capital markets when setting discount rates on 
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short-term investments dissuade people from making 
expenditures in seismic safety, which would improve value 
over the long-term. Risk is understood as exposure to danger, 
but it is often expressed as the probability that an event of a 
given magnitude will occur in a given timeframe.27 While 
probability is a scientifically meaningful concept, it does not 
translate well into the policy environment of extreme future 
hazards. Placed up against the propensity to spend for short-
term gain, estimates of the probability of an extreme event can 
give people the illusion of safety, a loophole for those who have 
other needs that they would prefer to prioritize. The 
presentation of risk as the probability that an event will occur, 
together with a bias for expenditures that earn present instead 
of future value, produce the specter of an endless loop of 
studies without decisive action about the problem of 
earthquakes.28 
V. CONCLUSION: TO SAFEGUARD INVESTMENTS, 
INTERNALIZE THE EXTERNALITY 
The conundrum for earthquake-safe capital investment 
created by these biases and distortions in decision-making will 
require many problem-solving efforts, but the starting point is 
relatively simple. Decision-makers should be provided with the 
estimated financial losses to their buildings and infrastructure 
should an extreme event occur today, based on the 
reconstruction or rehabilitation costs of existing and proposed 
capital assets, shown in nominal values (i.e., current prices).29 
This is specialized knowledge that people currently lack when 
weighing, or framing, their capital investment decisions. 
                                               
durable capital investments. Id. Similarly, capital investments made without regard to 
impending future losses from earthquake violate this assumption, posing what may be 
severe problems of intergenerational equity. Id. 
27. Cf. Your Earthquake Risk, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/your-earthquake-risk 
(last visited May 11, 2017) (“Three main factors together determine seismic risks: the 
level of seismic hazard, the number of people and amount of property that are exposed 
to seismic hazards and how vulnerable these people and property are to the hazards.”). 
28. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert & Sandi Doughton, Washington’s 30-Year Earthquake 
Drill for the ‘Big One’: Order Studies. Ignore Them. Repeat., THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/northwest/washington-
30-year-earthquake-drill-for-big-one-order-studies-ignore-them-repeat/; Doughton, 
supra note 17. 
29. Displaying future costs in nominal values is the functional equivalent of using a 
zero discount rate. 
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Without this information, it is unlikely that the effects of an 
impending earthquake would be incorporated into their 
investment decisions. 
In economic terms, extreme future events are externalities. 
They are generally not part of the deal that is made when a 
permit is granted or a capital asset is constructed. If protection 
against a hazard is not part of the price paid for a capital 
investment, then the hazard, real as it may be, is external to 
the transaction that brought about the capital investment. 
Making estimates of the damage or loss forecasted from 
earthquakes as plain to see as capital construction costs 
creates transparency for the externality, and provides a basis 
for discussion about the difficult trade-offs that the threat of a 
9.0 earthquake brings to the residents of the region. Presented 
alongside the added cost of protecting a new asset with seismic 
reinforcement, forecasts of losses from earthquakes can 
motivate developers to internalize the externality within the 
design of buildings and infrastructure. Set against the cost to 
retrofit existing assets, such forecasts of loss serve as 
appropriate financial targets for capital investment across the 
region, even if such targets appear so large that it may only be 
possible to fill the gap incrementally over time. Forecasts of 
loss also describe in dollar values the benefits of regulatory 
changes in the long-term interest of residents, such as changes 
in building codes. Similarly, for the damages that remain 
unforeseen or unavoidable, they create a target for capital 
reserves that policymakers, businesses, homeowners, and 
other residents can begin to take into account. This is a 
difficult but necessary step. Catastrophe is expensive, yet the 
effort to avoid catastrophe also comes at a cost. The people of 
the Cascadia region will have to bear one or face the other. 
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